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This thesis examines the plans for assessing and mitigating resistance to optimized
manning. The Land Attack Destroyer (DD-2 1 ) will be a new surface warship designed to
operate with a seventy-five percent smaller crew than today's Destroyers. This dramatic
reduction in manpower is part of Optimized Manning, and will likely require equally
dramatic changes in training, maintenance, and personnel management. Change
management theory says that implementing radical changes to an organization's culture
and power structures often incurs resistance.
Data was derived from the writings, presentations and interviews with DD-21
program officers and consultants. While there is no formal plan for building acceptance
of optimized manning, findings indicate that program developers and other stakeholders
recognize the potential for resistance and the need to manage it. The main sources of
resistance include: cost of automation and technology; Navy culture; legacy systems;
designers and sponsors; and a tendency to oversell programs. This thesis recommends
the systematic definition of stakeholders and sources of resistance for optimized manning,
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There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
or more uncertain of success than to take the lead in the introduction of a
new order of things, because the innovation has for enemies all those who
have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those
who may do well under new (Machiavelli, The Prince ).
A new order of things has been proposed for the Surface Navy of the twenty-first
century. In response to a redefined naval strategy that focuses on near-shore regional
conflicts and in recognition of austere long-term budgets, the Naval Sea Systems
Command has initiated the planning and design process for a new family of warships: the
Twenty-First Century Combatants or SC-21. The first member of that family is to be the
Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) and a major design specification is a crew that is
substantially smaller than that currently on any ship of the same size and mission as this
new vessel.
The push behind the requirement for a reduced crew is the high cost of manpower
over the life of a ship. Navy designers also recognize that such a radical change in crew
size will require a change in many of the Fleet's current equipment and procedures. As a
result, the proposals for DD-21 promise to revolutionize the way the U.S. Surface Fleet
trains, supports and fights its ships. Organizational change theory calls such events in the
life of an organization discontinuous changes (Nadler & Tushman, 1988). Theory also
says that these types of changes, when they occur in long-established, stable organizations
such as the United States Navy, are likely to be met with skepticism and resistance.
This thesis examines the how the DD-21 program plans to manage resistance to
optimized manning within the Fleet operating core and other stakeholders. Mintzberg
(1989) classifies those members of an organization who perform the basic work of the
organization as the operating core. For the purposes of this study, the operating core
pertains to Fleet personnel. However, AnsofFand McDonnell (1990) state that influential
internal and external stakeholders should be considered in an organization facing dramatic
change.
This thesis compiles a data set related to the DD-21 process plan for identifying and
managing resistance within the operating core and other stakeholders. It then compares
that data to change management theory for managing innovation in a large, complex
organization. The data set was developed from the writings and presentations of principal
members of the DD-21 program office responsible for the reduced manning initiatives.
Archival data was supplemented with video teleconference and telephone interviews of
members of the program office to answer five research questions:
1
.
Who are the stakeholders in optimized manning and what role will they play in
successful implementation?
2. What are the expected major sources of resistance?
3. What are the major facilitators for successful implementation of optimized
manning?
4. What are the specific plans for developing acceptance of optimized manning
among the stakeholders?
5. What is the relationship between DD-21 and the overall set of changes
affecting the Surface Fleet?
This evaluation of the change management process is intended to provide an assessment of
the plans and policies of the program office early in the life of the DD-21 project. Such an
assessment should provide valuable feedback to aid the process planning in its formative
stages.
Chapter II provides background information on DD-21 as well as three other
programs affecting the future of Surface Warfare. It also contains a brief summary of
some reactions from the Fleet to those projects. Chapter III presents a review of change
management literature, especially theories concerning resistance management. Chapter IV
outlines the sources of archival data and the interview process. Data related to the
research questions are presented in Chapter V. Chapter VI contains a comparison of the
data and theory, including conclusions and recommendations for improvement of the plan,
and suggested areas for further research.

H. THE LAND ATTACK DESTROYER (DD-21)
A. PROGRAM BACKGROUND
In 1992 the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), in concert with the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), published the white
paper "...From the Sea," in response to the changing national security environment
following the end of the Cold War. According to that planning statement, the downfall of
the Soviet Union had triggered a fundamental shift in strategic focus. Gone was the
Maritime Strategy of the 1980's with its scenarios for open-ocean, global warfare. The
Navy of the twenty-first century would concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from
the sea.
Littoral operations are those near-shore missions conducted within twenty-five miles
of a coastline. The primary requirement of a strategy focused on the littorals is the ability
to transition from the open ocean to the near-shore and from the near-shore to dry land
and back again. The main objective of such operations is the projection of power inland
and the influence of events, both combat and non-combat, ashore (SECNAV, 1992). In
the new strategy statement, the CNO put forth a series of immediate tasks aimed at
supporting the vision of regional warfare "...from the sea." One of those tasks is the
design and procurement of systems that will be able to fight and survive in the littoral area.
The Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) is to be one of those systems.
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for DD-21 was approved in
November 1997. In it, the mission ofthe new Destroyer is laid out and it includes forward
presence/deterrence, land attack in support of the ground campaign, Joint/Combined
battlespace dominance in the littoral region, and the ability to conduct a wide variety of
operations other than war. DD-21 is to be a replacement for both the SPRUANCE and
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY classes of warships and is expected to enter service in 2009
at a price of $750 million each (CNO, 1997).
The pressures of mission and cost are at the heart of the DD-2 1 design. It is logical
that a ship's intended mission dictates its form, particularly when that mission is central to
a new national strategy. However, costs, especially life-cycle costs, have taken on an
especially vigorous role in the design and operating concepts of this new vessel. It is
expected that military budgets will have near zero-growth well into the twenty-first
century. Because crew costs have long dominated surface ship life-cycle costs, amounting
to nearly fifty percent over a twenty year life span, reducing the size of the crew promises
important monetary benefits (Bost, 1995). In response to these pressures, the ORD
directs that "[human systems integration] (HSI) will be used to minimize system life-cycle
costs and maximize the performance effectiveness, reliability, readiness and safety of the
ship and crew" (CNO, 1997, p. 10).
B. REDUCED MANNING
In a 1996 memorandum on DD-21 manpower goals, Rear Admiral Murphy, then
Director of Surface Warfare (N86), assigned a target for crew size of ninety-five officers
and sailors including an embarked air detachment. The number is actually at one end of a
manning spectrum with 150 being the upper threshold (NAVSEA/PMS-500M, July 1998).
Even at the high end of the range however, that target represents a near sixty percent
reduction in manpower from today's 350-person crew for a vessel similar in size and
mission to the proposed Destroyer.
The intended means to that end goal is to be a revolutionary application of technology
and a general overhaul of standard operating procedures. According to the ORD,
manning levels will be reduced by a series of Human Systems Integration (HSI) measures
including functional design and automation to reduce watch station requirements, the
elimination and/or combination of traditional shipboard ratings, the automation of training
and technical support and the cross-training of skills between ratings (CNO, 1997).
In response to the directives of the ORD, the DD-21 project office has initiated a top
down functional analysis that starts with an assumed beginning manning level of zero and
then requires industry designers to justify human involvement with any particular system
(Bush, 1998). Furthermore, the manning goal of ninety-five has been established as a Key
Performance Parameter (KPP) in the design ofDD-21 and the sailor is considered to be a
component of the engineering process rather than as an unlimited resource. Allocation of
all three components, people, hardware and software, is to be carried out in terms of
tradeoffs between life-cycle costs and performance (Bush, 1998).
There are two ultimate goals of this effort to optimize the crew size and composition
on DD-21
. First is a reduction in lifetime owner cost of the ship due to a smaller manning
requirement and therefore a smaller recruiting, training, pay and benefit infrastructure.
The second is described as an increased emphasis during the design and implementation of
the program on human performance, productivity, safety and crew quality of life. It is
stated by the program office that the end result of this increased attention will be enhanced
job satisfaction and greater acceptance of technology initiatives (Bush, 1998). The focus
of this research is to identify and evaluate the change management plans that particularly
address this aspect ofDD-21 implementation.
C. OTHER CHANGE EFFORTS
DD-21 is not the only major change underway affecting Surface Warfare. There are a
number of projects now being developed or implemented whose success or failure could
have significant consequences for the surface fleet. For the purposes of this research,
three of them warrant introduction. They are: Smart Ship, the Naval Research
Laboratory's Damage Control-Automation for Reduced Manning (DC-ARM) project, and
the CNO's Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (EDTC) Workload Reduction program.
1. Smart Ship
Smart Ship was initiated in 1995 as a result of a report by the Naval Research
Advisory Committee (NRAC) on reduced manning stating that the major obstacle to
changes in manning structure was culture and tradition rather than a lack of technology
and know-how (CNSL, 1997). Smart Ship was to be a challenge to the traditional
manning and operating procedures of the U.S. Surface Fleet, and its goals for reduced
manning, while on a more modest scale than those of DD-21, are very similar. The
program charter calls for a reduction of manning and related cost savings on present and
future surface vessels through the application of innovative technology and the
overhauling of operating procedures (NAVSEA, 1998).
To date, the magnitude of those reductions does not approach the goals set for DD-
2 1 , however, they still merit the attention of this study. According to a program status
report in September 1998, the lead ship in the program, USS YORKTOWN (CG-48), has
demonstrated a reduction of crew size between ten and fifteen percent or forty-four
enlisted and five officers (NAVSEA, 1998). The viability of this new manning structure
was demonstrated during YORKTOWN' s normal training and inspection cycle prior to
her five-month deployment to the Caribbean Sea and one-month evaluation period with
the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN-73) Battle Group. During this period she was
assessed by the Navy's combat readiness, manning and operational testing organizations
with the result that her crew, equipment and operating procedures were found to be
effective and ready to carry out any assigned duties (CNSL, 1997).
2. DC-ARM
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) created the DC-ARM program in 1995 in
reaction to the same study that launched Smart Ship. The purpose of the program is to
reduce the manning infrastructure of the damage control organization onboard ships
through the application of automation technology. The stated objective is the
development of a damage control system capable of automated detection, assessment, and
reaction to a fire or flooding situation without the use of human investigators, decision-
makers or communicators (NRL, 1998).
The manning goals for DC-ARM are set into a three-phase development and
evaluation process. The first phase seeks a thirty-five percent reduction in current
manpower levels by developing new organizational structures and procedures for the
application of current damage-control technologies. This phase will establish a manpower
baseline for the next two phases that will demonstrate the feasibility of further reductions
through the application of new technologies. The goal of the second phase is a sixty
percent reduction from current manning by adding to the phase one baseline a set of
automated sensory and control technologies that will allow for the elimination of human
investigators and the centralization of supervisory control. In phase three, the goal for
damage control manning is sixteen personnel covering the survivability command center
and three response teams. Given that those same functions now require 1 10 sailors, such
a goal represents an eighty-five percent reduction in damage control manpower (Farley,
1998).
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The testing of each phase is being carried out at the NRL facility onboard ex-US
S
SHADWELL. This former amphibious ship has been rebuilt to serve as a floating
laboratory that enables researchers to conduct full-scale fire and flooding scenarios to
demonstrate technology applications. These evaluations involve real fire, smoke and
water within the confines of the test ship and are conducted with little or no simulation of
the effects of battle-damage. The DC-ARM research on SHADWELL will be conducted
with Fleet operators and will build on lessons learned from Smart Ship and the submarine
community's experience with small crew damage control (NRL, 1998).
3. IDTC Workload Reduction
The inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) is the scheduled period following a six-
month deployment during which a ship's officers and crew are expected to transfer
personnel, conduct training of individuals and teams, perform maintenance and equipment
upgrades and in all other respects, get the ship ready for the next six-month cruise.
Currently, the IDTC is twelve months or roughly twice the length of a deployment and is
considered in many ways to be an administrative burden on the backs of the fleet (CNO,
151947ZOCT98).
In an effort to reduce that burden, increase time allotted to commanding officers for
training, and improve the quality of home life for Sailors, the CNO initiated a program in
July of 1998 to reexamine the way the Surface Fleet conducts its training and
administrative business. Specifically, the appropriate commanders were directed to review
the current structure of inspections, evaluations and administrative requirements in order
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to reduce the non-deployed workload and return twenty-five percent of the IDTC to the
discretion of the individual commanding officer (CNO, 201200Z JUL 98).
At the heart of this directive is a requirement that items, whether equipment, records
or supplies, would be inspected only once during the cycle. In the past, any individual
item could be inspected more than once depending on under how many areas of
responsibility that item fell. For example, both the aviation and engineering/damage
control communities examined aviation fire fighting equipment. Under this new vision, all
of the controlling authorities are directed to cooperate in a general effort directed towards
the consolidation and cancellation of dozens of redundant inspections and evaluations
(CNO, 151947ZOCT98).
The end result of this realignment process is to be a streamlined system that receives a
ship from its post-deployment stand-down and moves it quickly and effectively through its
maintenance, training and evaluation phases and delivers it to the Fleet Commander ready
for the Carrier Battle Group. The new process is intended to allow for guaranteed leave
and stand-down periods, more time for training as determined by the ship's commander
and a more stable schedule for the ship and therefore a more stable life for the crew.
D. REACTION
Machiavelli's statement about change presented in the introduction suggests that those
instituting a large-scale innovation can expect reactions to their proposals to range from
lukewarm to hostile. In view of that claim and given that the introduction of DD-2
1
promises to bring radical change to an old and well-established organization, one might
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expect the reaction from the Fleet to be marked more by skepticism than enthusiasm. The
following limited research in support of this study's proposal development indicates that
that may indeed be the case.
1. Survey
In an attempt to develop an initial sense of opinion and reaction to the manning
proposals of DD-21, a limited survey instrument was developed and distributed to
members of the operating core of the Fleet. The sample was very small (n=ll) and not
random. The subject group consisted oftwo 0-5s, two 0-4s, one 0-3, three E-7s, one E-
8, one E-9 and one CWO-4. All serve in Surface Warfare. A copy of the survey
instrument is located in Appendix A.
An interesting characteristic of the responses is that the only subject to indicate a
confident reaction to DD-21 was a former crewmember of Smart Ship. Of the other
subjects two were undecided and eight were skeptical. The reasons for skepticism seemed
to depend upon the individual's background. For example, a post-Executive Officer
indicated that he was concerned about housekeeping, such as cleaning and interior
painting, manning for General Quarters, and manning for underway replenishment. A
Master Chief Petty Officer believed there was a potential for problems with training,
corrosion control and in-port duty-section manning. Only the individual who had served
on YORKTOWN and had seen the results of the Smart Ship program firsthand expressed
confidence in the reduced manning concepts of DD-2 1 . This Damage Controlman Chief
stated that anything is possible, but that large scale manning reductions will require high-
cost automation and difficult choices regarding new operating philosophies.
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2. Conference
In October 1998, the Reduced Manning division of the DD-21 program office
presented their proposals to First Class Midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy.
Following the presentation, the students were asked for their questions and comments. A
few common themes were present in the questions. First, there was a concern about
adequate redundancy of the automated systems that would make the small crew of DD-21
possible. The Midshipmen also questioned the ability to train new operators and
maintainers while still operating and maintaining the ship's systems with such a limited
crew. Lastly, there was a general concern for the possibility for overloading a small crew
and driving down their quality of life both at sea and in port. Overall, the Midshipmen
seemed to be skeptical. One future officer clearly expressed his resistance to the
optimized manning concept, calling the plan for DD-21 a "nice fairy tale" with "no
solutions to existing problems and too many 'I don't knows'" (NAVSEA/PMS-500M,
October 1998, p. 4).
3. Articles
Finally, there have been a variety of views on the subject of reduced manning
expressed in the pages of professional naval journals. Anthony DiGiorgio (1998), an
electrical engineer, was involved in past automation efforts for the Navy, specifically the
design of the control systems for the propulsion and electrical plants of gas-turbine
warships. In his article, DiGiorgio (1998) expresses concern for Navy leadership rather
than technology. He asserts that the concept of automation is not well understood by
most of the surface force, and that past efforts to automate ships, such as the SPRUANCE
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Destroyers, failed because Navy leaders chose to fall back on tradition and place sailors in
front of consoles that were designed to react in microseconds, faster than a human could
ever diagnose and correct a problem. He claims the Navy has had smart systems on their
ships for a long time and those systems have proven their ability when given the chance.
The concerns regarding Smart ship and DD-21 can, in his opinion, be mitigated by
educating decision-makers to ensure they understand both the systems that already exist
and those that are proposed for the future.
Lieutenant Chuck Good (1996) expresses a very different opinion in his article "who's
left to paint?" He asks that question and then cites a series of basic shipboard evolutions
such as painting, line-handling and administrative record keeping that the Navy has
traditionally carried out with large amounts of manpower. He states that the problem with
reducing crew size is not the technological risk associated with automation, but the
functional risk ofunmet manpower requirements. He states that the Navy has traditionally
designed its ships for, and carried out its missions with a large crew that included extra
hands for periodic evolutions and large-scale emergencies. LT Good believes the Navy
should consider that tradition to be a core competency and not abandon it.
Another interesting opinion is that of Rear Admiral Lyons (1998) who, while serving
as president of the Board of Inspection and Survey (InServ), wrote an article about
damage control and reduced manning. In it, he claims that within the Navy, there is
significant concern about the ability of small crews to handle the requirements of
shipboard maintenance and damage control. And, while commercial technology may help
alleviate some of the maintenance demands, he believes that the traditional approach of
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overpowering damage with manpower can only be changed with a shift in the mind-set of
the Fleet. He acknowledges the fiscal realities that are driving optimized manning and
states that the past assumption that large crews will always be available is no longer valid.
His vision of the future damage control party is based on the idea that every individual
onboard will be a damage control expert. When a ship is damaged, only those watches
that are most vital will remain manned, all other personnel will respond to the emergency
as a single team (Lyons, 1998).
The Admiral then poses a series of questions regarding the application of technology
to tactical problems. He asks, if technology can help improve the situational awareness,
reaction time and accuracy of the tactical team, then why can it not do the same for the
damage control team? If the answer is that it can, then he believes that a smaller crew can
indeed handle the demands of combat damage control (Lyons, 1998).
E. SUMMARY
The Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) is being developed in response to a new set of
mission priorities for the Navy's Surface Fleet. The concept of optimized manning has
been proposed in response to a new set of budgetary demands and technological
opportunities. Together, they form an important element in a set of organizational
changes that includes Smart Ship and DC-ARM. All of those changes, but particularly
DD-21, indicate a movement toward a Surface Navy that will be more dependent on
technology and automation, and less dependent on manpower.
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The small sample of reactions presented in this chapter suggest that some members of
the Fleet may not have a positive reaction to the changes contained in the proposals for
DD-2 1 and optimized manning. If the officers and sailors of the Surface Fleet resist the
concept of optimized manning, as change theory indicates they might, then the designers
and implementers of DD-2 1 will face a substantial obstacle to the successful introduction
of this new warship.
This thesis examines the plans for managing organizational resistance, particularly
during this early developmental phase. It seeks to answer five questions regarding the
stakeholders of and the possible sources of resistance to optimized manning, the major
facilitators of successful implementation, the plans for building acceptance of optimized
manning and the relationship ofDD-2 1 to the other changes underway in Surface Warfare.
Problems with past efforts aimed at system automation and crew reduction, such as
the engineering plant in USS SPRUANCE, suggest that an examination of change
management theory, particularly theory dealing with managing resistance may provide
important insights for the successful design and implementation of optimized manning.
17
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HI. MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
A. MANAGING COMPLEX CHANGE
In the preface of their book "Organizational Transitions" Richard Beckhard and
Reuben Harris (1987) state that managers of large-scale change face a dilemma in trying
to redefine the organization while still maintaining enough stability to continue to do
whatever the organization is supposed to do This dilemma provides the organization's
leadership with a new set of challenges and new requirements for managing innovation.
Clearly, a significant challenge for the leaders of Naval Surface Warfare is the successful
introduction of DD-21 with all of its revolutionary changes, while still maintaining
readiness throughout an existing fleet that was designed for markedly different
requirements of mission and economy.
The challenge is made more difficult by the conflicting pressures identified by Richard
Walton (1987) in his discussion of managing innovative change. Walton uses the term
metacompetence to describe the strategic ability of an organization's leadership to address
five elements of innovation needed to respond to changes in the organization's
environment. These five elements relate an organization's capacity for innovative change
to its guiding model, economic necessity, social values, institutional unity, and
competence.
As an illustration, the new guiding model for the Surface Navy envisions a future fleet
of modestly crewed and technically advanced warships. Economic necessity is driving the
former and a high level of technical competence in today's Fleet may enable the latter.
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The need for low-cost worldwide presence has generated a requirement for significantly
smaller crews because of the accompanying promise of reduced life-cycle costs.
The social values of the Surface Fleet may not yield to such radical innovation.
Current manning and operating guidelines are built on decades of tradition and experience.
A drastic departure from that tradition and experience would predictably meet with
substantial resistance from Fleet operators. The ability of Navy leadership to deal
adequately with such conflicting forces, to adapt to a complex global security
environment, to capitalize on the competence of the organization and develop support for
the innovative process is crucial for the long-term effectiveness of the Fleet. These are
some of the challenges in managing large-scale, complex change.
1. Open-Systems Planning for Change
The open-systems planning model presented by Beckhard and Harris (1987) is a
seven-phase process to help managers analyze their environment, their organization and
their expectations for the future. The end product is a set of cost-effective options that
will take the organization from its present state to some desired future state and place it in
a position more capable of dealing with and succeeding in a changing environment.
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Open-Systems Planning Process
1. Determine the "core mission" of the organization.
2. Map the demand system.
3. Map the current response system.
4. Project the probable demand system, given no change
in organization impact.
5. Identify the desired state.
6. List activities necessary to achieve the desired state.
7. Define cost-effective options.
Figure 3.1 Open-Systems Planning Process (Beckhard & Harris, 1987, p.13)
Applying this model to the DD-21 case shows that the Navy strategic white papers
"... From the Sea" and "Forward ... from the Sea" recast both the core mission and the
demand system for the U.S. Surface Fleet. By changing the center of strategic focus from
blue water to the littoral, the core mission was altered to include at its center, the ability to
operate near a shore in direct support of a land engagement. The new demand system
now includes all of the hazards associated with naval combat within twenty-five miles of a
hostile coast. The desired future state will be a fleet built around a family of ships
designed to meet the core mission requirements in the face of the new demand system. At
the end of that planning and evaluation process, DD-21 was chosen as the most cost-
effective option.
Item six of the process model points out the need to develop an activity plan leading to
the desired future state. This plan should address the appropriate elements identified by
Walton (1987), and with regard to DD-21, the emphasis of the process plan should be on
enhancing the ability of the Surface Navy to meet the demands of economic necessity
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while maintaining support for the innovation. The effectiveness of that plan depends on
the conflicting or supporting social values, the internal unity or the predisposition to
cooperate and develop consensus, and the competence for innovation within the
organization.
2. The Change Process
The change process can be thought of as a three stage model with a future state,
defining the organization's desired structures and processes, the current state, and the
transition state, the movement of the organization from one state to the other (Beckhard
& Harris, 1987). The connection between the open-systems process and this three-stage
model is that the output of the open-systems model, the optimal solution for the future
environment, becomes the goal future state. The transition state represents the change
management process and the activity plan for accomplishing that future state. The open-
systems concept is relevant here because complex external and internal forces must be
planned for, balanced and adapted to in order to optimize the chances of success in an
innovation of this magnitude.
The current state of the Surface Fleet is well defined and represented by the current
class of Destroyers, USS ARLIEGH BURKE (DDG-51), and their traditional manning
and support structures. The proposed future of Surface Warfare represented by DD-21 is
currently at a stage somewhere between defining the future state and initiating the
transition state. While there is a fairly clear vision of the desired future capabilities of the
ship itself, much of the hardware, including the hull, have not taken form. Such critical
mission areas as maintenance support, training (both onboard and ashore), and final crew
22
size and composition are also undefined, so the desired future state of the Surface Force is
in flux.
The transition from the current state to an undefined future is underway. Public
discussion of optimized manning as a vision of the future for surface ship doctrine began
as early as 1995 in an U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings article co-authored by Bost,
Mellis and Dent. In that article, the tradeoff between crew size and system automation
was described as a choice between traditional manning paradigms and more efficient
mixture of man and machine. The discussion of small crews and automated systems
continues today in nearly every issue of that journal. Additionally, the DD-21 program
office has published a set of milestones for hardware development and testing begun in
FY97 and ending in FY01 (S&T Webbook, Nov 98). The focus of this thesis is on
elaborating the specifics of the transition plan related to manning issues.
This thesis also attempts to describe the critical activities of the transition phase that
have been defined at this early planning stage. A critical activity is an element of the
transition phase whose success or failure directly impacts the overall success or failure of
the change process itself. These and all other critical activities, such as start dates,
meetings, communications, training sessions and structure changes that are critical to a
successful transition, should ideally be part of an overall activity or change plan
(Beckhard & Harris, 1987).
With regard to the focus of this study, that activity plan should include a set of
interventions, or starting points for the change transition. These intervention points are
significant because either they will provide early planning and implementation successes,
23
or they are important decision nodes, or they identify points in the organization that are
having trouble dealing with the upcoming change (Beckhard & Harris, 1987). The
potential skepticism and resistance within the operating core described earlier falls into the
last category. Figure 3.2 maps the change management process up to the transition state.
Why change?
Determine the need for change













Getting from here to there
Assessing the present in terms ofthe






Figure 3.2 Change Management Process (Beckhard & Harris, 1987, p.81)
3. Commitment Strategies
As the statement of Machiavelli in the introduction suggests, resistance to change,
particularly in an organization as stable as the military, is to be expected. Tichy and
Devanna (1990) state that people resist change because they need time to assess the cost
and benefits of that change to them. They suggest that there are three major technical
reasons for resistance to change within an organization: (1) habit and inertia, (2) fear of
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the unknown or loss of organizational predictability, and (3) the sunk costs of current
methods. In order to minimize such resistance, leaders must restructure and reframe the
ways in which they and the other members of the organization think about and react to
common problems and their possible solutions.
Regardless of the source of resistance, however, there are individuals and groups,
within the organization and its stakeholders, who must be committed to the success of
change in order for it to be successfully implemented. According to Beckhard & Harris
(1987) there is a critical mass of individuals within each group that must actively
cooperate in the planning and implementation of change, and they suggest the creation of
a commitment plan in order to secure the support of that critical mass. Such a plan has
four elements: identify the critical stakeholders, define the critical mass, develop a plan for
gaining the commitment of that mass, and create a feedback system to assess progress.
The commitment plan is a management tool designed to overcome what Ansoff and
McDonnell (1990) define as behavioral resistance within an organization.
B. DEVELOPING CULTURAL ACCEPTANCE
1. Building Acceptance Versus Overcoming Resistance
The phrases "building acceptance" and "overcoming resistance" tend to be used
interchangeably, but they have different meanings. An effort to build acceptance is aimed
at developing the commitment, meeting the expectations and gaining the active
cooperation of both internal and external stakeholders. In contrast, measures designed to
overcome resistance may have as a goal nothing more than preventing active opposition
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(Beckhard and Harris, 1987). This study focuses more on building acceptance than
overcoming resistance.
2. Behavioral Resistance
Resistance to organizational change is classified as behavioral when it literally
manifests itself in the behavior of individuals. Procrastination, inefficiencies, slowdowns,
and sabotage are some of the many consequences of unresolved resistance and these
problems may present themselves at any point in the change process (Ansoff &
McDonnell, 1990). Typical attitudes that may attach themselves to the DD-21 project
include rejection, "There's nothing wrong with the Fleet that a proper budget wouldn't
fix," and regression, "Let's forget this pie in the sky and get back to the proper way of
running a ship," to name just two. When this type of resistance is found in the previously
identified critical mass, there is real a danger of having those individuals balk and withhold
their cooperation.
Such resistance is pervasive and has troubled previous attempts by the Navy to reduce
manning levels through the application of automation. Regression plagued the
SPRUANCE Destroyer program when, due to early equipment problems, engineering
spaces that were designed to be unmanned were at first temporarily, and then officially
manned full-time in accordance with new operating guidelines designed to minimize the
perceived risks of automated machinery (DiGiorgio, 1998). Only now, some twenty-four
years after the introduction of the gas-turbine propulsion plant, has Smart Ship begun to
take advantage of the technology invested in those ships by removing the full-time watch.
Those individuals originally responsible for developing the operating guidelines for the
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new technology did not, in the end, believe in that technology. When given the
opportunity, they regressed to the old way of running an engineering plant and the
innovative process was stopped cold.
The following is a list of factors that may contribute to behavioral resistance within an
organization:
1. The degree of discontinuity in the historical culture and power
structure implied by the change.
2. The length of the period over which the change is introduced.
3. The threats/insecurities/loss of prestige/loss of power implied for key
individuals.




The strength of positive/negative loyalty toward the organization felt
by the participants.
6. The strength of the culture and power drives at the respective power
centers. (AnsofF& McDonnell, 1990, p.412)
If the change represents a dramatic break with the organization's historical culture and
structure, resistance to the change will increase. If the time available for the transition is
too short or the threats to the power of key individuals perceived to be too great,
resistance will increase. If the members of the organization do not expect the change to
adequately contribute to the survival of the organization, resistance will increase.
However, the relative strength of the previous factors depends on the loyalty of the
members and the strength of the organization's culture. For example, when members of
an organization are very loyal, and they believe a given innovation is critical to the survival
of the organization, they will be more supportive of the change effort.
Because optimized manning can be interpreted as a radical departure from the current
state of Surface Warfare, implementation may encounter problems due to many of these
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factors. The cultural upheaval that seemingly would accompany a seventy-five percent
reduction in manning, and the shift in power structures that are implied by a general
transformation of operating procedures, could trigger the type of resistance Ansoff and
McDonnell indentify.
Everett Rogers (1995) approaches the same problem of building acceptance of a
change from a different direction. Instead of examining the sources of resistance, he
identifies five variables or attributes of an innovation to explain the speed at which that
innovation is accepted by an organization. Those variables are: (1) the perceived relative
advantage of the new system over the current one, (2) the compatibility between the new
system and the organization's values, past experiences with change, and the needs of
stakeholders, (3) the complexity of the new system from the perspective of the adopters,
or in this case, the operating core of the fleet, (4) the trialability or allowance for limited
experimentation, and finally, (5) the observability of the results by others in the
organization.
An examination of the DD-21 program indicates that these five factors can work in
contrary directions, and with varying degrees of force. For example, the promised cost-
savings and quality-of-life improvements would yield a relative advantage in favor of
acceptance. However, the possible compatibility problems between the new manning and
operating structures and the experiences of Fleet Sailors and the complexity of such a
sweeping change could prove to be very strong factors working against acceptance. The
trialability and observability of the DD-21 program would depend on the method of
implementation. If it were broken up into increments, those smaller projects could be
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tested and the results published for the evaluation of the fleet operators. Such a measured
approach might tend to break down the overwhelming nature of the entire project and
possibly mitigate the potentially negative factors.
3. Building a Launching Platform
Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) describe a launching platform for an organizational
change that is similar in form and purpose to the change management processes presented
by Beckhard and Harris (1989). The main distinction between them is that the launching
platform is specifically focused on building acceptance of the innovation, in support of the





2. Marshall a power-base sufficient to give the change momentum and
continuity.
3 Provide a detailed plan for the change process that assigns responsibilities,
resources, steps and interactions through which the change will be carried
out.
4. Include behavioral features that will optimize the acceptance and support
for the new strategies and capabilities. (Ansoff& McDonnell, 1990,
p. 413)
It is at this point of building the launch platform that the work of Ansoff and
McDonnell is closely aligned with that ofBeckhard and Harris. Where the latter called for
the identification of a critical mass and development of a commitment plan, the former
recommend conducting a resistance and behavioral diagnosis in order to create a
cultural/political support/resistance map (Ansoff& McDonnell, 1990). Both yield a list
of those groups and individuals who are vital to the change implementation and must
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therefore come to accept and support the change. Because these theories are so closely
aligned, this study will use much of their terminology interchangeably.
Once the resistance map is produced and the relevant groups and individuals have been
identified, there are three additional steps in the process for building acceptance. First, a
pro-change climate must be created by eliminating resistance-triggering factors such as
misperceptions, exaggerations, fears and anxiety through education and information
programs that ensure the entire organization has a clear and accurate picture of the good
and bad elements of the upcoming change. An innovation that has a high level of
trialability and observability (Rogers, 1995), especially in limited, incremental steps, would
make this effort even more effective. There must also be an effort to build a pro-change
power base through a system of coalition building, power shifting and rewards in order to
place more power behind those groups and individuals who are critical to the success of
the change and/or are more likely to give it early support (Ansoff& McDonnell, 1990).
Next, the change implementation plan needs to have behavioral features built into it.
Those members of the organization identified as being critical for successful
implementation must be included in decision making when leadership is developing the
process plan. In contrast, those individuals and groups who will most likely continue to
resist the change, no matter what, should be placed as much as possible on the periphery
so that they do not poison the entire change effort. However, Ansoff and McDonnell
(1990) note that the application of the power to remove resistors should be used as a last
resort.
30
Ansoff and McDonnell ( 1 990) call for a contagion approach to build early acceptance
by starting implementation with groups already committed to the change and, after
rewarding their success, spreading the change to other parts of the organization.
Additionally, the change itself should be spread over as long a time period as possible in
order to reduce pressure on the organization's members. In the case of DD-21, the future
vision was published as early as 1995 while the ship was not expected to be in service for
another 10 years (Bost, 1995). Other articles, symposia and briefings have followed in a
type of education campaign. The details of these efforts will be examined in a later
chapter but they mark an early starting point in the program that has opened the DD-21
proposals for discussion and given the project office an avenue to begin winning
acceptance from Fleet operators.
The final step in building a launching platform deals with managing the follow through
of the process. Because no change implementation is a simple overnight event and
because there are always opportunities for unforeseen obstacles to develop, there needs to
be a well-planned management program in place that follows the change process through
to the end. Ansoff outlines seven elements of this management process, but three of them
merit particular attention with regard to DD-2 1
.
First and foremost, monitor and anticipate sources of resistance. This effort must
include a robust feedback system to enable the managers to sense the building up and
relief of resistance within the organization and shift attention and resources accordingly.
Second, as already alluded to, there should be projects aimed at transforming culture and
power structures. Lastly, Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) warn that the change is not fully
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implemented until it is institutionalized, meaning that the power structures, operating
procedures, reward systems and culture associated with an innovation, such as optimized
manning, have become supportive of that innovation. Implementation managers must not
claim victory too early. As in the case of the SPRUANCE Destroyers, those responsible
for the transition must guard against regression even after the lead ship is at sea.
4. Managed Resistance
Managed resistance or the "accordion" method of change management (Ansoff &
McDonnell, 1990) is designed to work under conditions of moderate urgency within the
time limits determined by the environmental pressures. The managed resistance approach
lies on a continuum between the two extremes of coercive and adaptive management. A
coercive style in its purest form is authoritarian with little or no concern for the reaction
and concerns of the organization's members. Resistance would simply be steam-rolled by
the power of the command hierarchy. An adaptive style lies on the opposite end of the
continuum and would be characterized by long time-lines, low urgency, heavy feedback
and a very methodical change process that minimizes the factors that could escalate
resistance. The name "accordion" is derived from the ability of this process to move
between these extremes depending upon the time urgency of a given change requirement.
Managed resistance uses a modular approach where the planning process is
subdivided into a set of modules that fit into a parallel planning and implementation
program that expands or compresses depending on the time constraints (Ansoff &
McDonnell, 1990). This parallel modular approach of the accordion method is more
appropriate to the as yet undefined requirements of DD-21 than traditional sequential
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planning/implementation methods. As individual requirements for DD-21 optimized
manning are defined, the change timeline containing the planning/implementation modules
will expand or contract depending on urgency. The parallel characteristic of the process
reduces the chances of a problem or delay in one module from having a cascade effect on
the entire process as might occur in a sequential plan. Furthermore, each module can be
tailored to address a particular source of resistance or stakeholder or both. Figure 3.3






















Figure 33 Parallel Planning/Implementation Modules of Accordion Method (Ansoff& McDonnell, 1990, p. 440)
The process begins with the organizational diagnosis of culture and resistance
followed by the design of program modules associated with each of the possible sources of
resistance throughout the entire change process. With DD-21, capability-building
modules might include such things as damage control manning, corrosion control and
space maintenance, and shore-based training support. As solutions to each of these areas
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of concern are designed and rolled out, there is a parallel effort for the training and
educating of the associated critical mass of stakeholders. In the case of damage control, a
logical group requiring attention might be the damage control instructors and inspectors at
the Afloat Training Groups. Strategy modules might deal with the changes in tactical
emphasis from open-ocean combat to warfare in the littorals. All of these modules would
proceed along separate time-lines under the control and guidance of the change managers
who monitor success and failure through a matrix feedback system (Ansoff& McDonnell,
1990).
A positive characteristic of this approach is its ability to turn the entire change
program into an incremental process, and to link the development of capability (human
skills and attitudes as well as technologies) with defined strategic initiatives. With the
accordion method, the organization is asked to swallow the change one mouthful at a time
rather than all at once and it is therefore less likely to choke on the enormity of the entire
project.
Managed resistance is described as a complex method that demands continual
attention from top management and quite often it outstrips the design know-how of an
organization's personnel. For these reasons, Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) state that
outside consultants are commonly used for planning and design. Such external help is
useful for conducting impartial strategic and resistance diagnoses and for developing a set
of options that may threaten the current power structure. However, they caution that an
essential element of this method of management is the continued involvement of the
organization's leaders regardless of the role played by outside specialists. Specifically,
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Ansoff and McDonnell ( 1 990) state that those members of the organization who will be
responsible for implementation of the program must also be included among the planners
of the program. Their absence from the planning process risks building resistance within
the very group that should be most supportive of the innovation.
5. The Change Leader
Tichy and Devanna (1990) describe the transition manager or transformational leader
as an organizational steward who helps people get through a transition. They claim that
the leader must recognize and understand the need to provide space and support for
people as they work at interpreting and understanding the change. They present the
change leader as a symbolic figure who must stay at the center of the change process.
With regard to the selection of the implementation leaders, Beckhard and Harris
(1987) define an effective transition manger as an individual who has adequate clout for
commanding the resources required for the project, respect of both the existing leadership
and the change advocates, and effective interpersonal skills. When discussing DD-21,
clout must include adequate authority within the military hierarchy the Surface Warfare
community. This is particularly important because so many of the influential groups will
most likely fall outside any direct chain-of-command of the project office. This situation
also increases the demand for respect and trust between all stakeholders and the need for
the transition manager to possess superior people skills because it is these traits that will




The optimized manning concepts imbedded within the DD-21 program portend
dramatic changes for the U.S. Surface Fleet, and change management theory suggests that
such dramatic changes often encounter resistance from among the stakeholders of an
established system. Anticipating that resistance, identifying its sources and developing a
plan to counter its effects are actions critical to the successful implementation of change.
A well designed launching platform for a large-scale change minimizes startup
resistance. It gathers an adequate power-base, provides a detailed plan for the change
process and has behavioral features that will develop acceptance and support for the new
system. A change process plan can follow a modular approach that serves to break the
total change effort into incremental steps, with each step being planned and implemented
along an independent timeline. Such an approach can enable the change leader to diagnose
potential resistance, and to monitor the effectiveness of efforts aimed at mitigating that




The commitment plan is a critical element of the resistance management process
discussed in the previous chapter. In its theoretical form, such a plan presents a series of
actions or events that are designed to develop support within critical stakeholder groups
for the change effort. Therefore, an examination of that plan should provide a glimpse of
the inner workings of, and the reasoning behind the change management process.
Unfortunately, because DD-21 is still in the early stages of planning, no explicit plan exists
(Lugo, 1999). However, an examination of a resistance management process is still
possible.
This thesis compares the explicit or implied commitment plan of the DD-2 1 program
office with resistance management theory and develops from that comparison an
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The purpose is to assist the efforts
of the program managers aimed at developing acceptance of the optimized manning
concept. In the absence of a tangible commitment plan, this study summarizes the
opinions of DD-21 program managers regarding the management of resistance, and
compares that summary with change management theory.
In order to develop an accurate and coherent synopsis of an implied resistance
management plan, a set of individuals was identified within the DD-21 hierarchy who are
closely linked to the development and implementation of optimized manning. A data set,
focused on the topic of resistance, its perceived effects on innovation and methods for its
mitigation, was then derived from the various writings, presentations and statements of
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those individuals and/or their principle assistants. Finally, because the available archival
data did not, in every case, address the specific topic of resistance management, a set of
interviews was conducted with selected members of the DD-21 organization to enrich the
findings.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY INDIVIDUALS
Development and implementation of the concept of optimized manning is the
responsibility of the PMS-500M office, one of six departments within the larger DD-21
program office at the Naval Sea Systems Command (see organization chart in Appendix
B). The various tasks related to that responsibility have been further delegated to two
principle assistants (PMS-500M1 and M3) and ten principle consultants. With regard to
the subject of this study, the work of three of those consultants is particularly relevant.
Frank Lugo, a consultant for PMS-500M and member of the personnel working
group, is heading the formation of an Integrated Process Team (IPT) for the purpose of
studying the current Navy system, including operating guidelines, personnel processes,
training programs and culture, that would be effected by the DD-21 program.
Membership of the team includes manning consultants, NAVSEA, the platform sponsor
N86, BUPERS, CNET, operational commanders such as SURFLANT and SURFPAC and
other members of the Surface Navy's training and operating community. The number of
individuals participating in the team vary with availability but average around fifty. The
goal of the IPT is the creation of a Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) that will lay
out a series of actions leading ultimately to the successful implementation of optimized
38
manning (Lugo, 1999). One part of that POAM will address the issue of building
acceptance of the coming changes within the Fleet.
Key members of the DD-21 program hierarchy include the program officer CAPT
Bush (PMS-500), the manning/human systems integration department head J. Robert Bost
(PMS-500M), consultants who form the four working groups under Bost, and Director of
Surface Warfare (N86) RADM Mullen, his staff and consultants. Members of the N86
organization were included because that office is NAVSEA's customer for DD-21 and
they provide significant input to the requirements definition and planning process
(Maxwell, 1999).
B. ARCHIVAL DATA SOURCES
Archival data were collected from various sources both in print and through Internet
websites. Printed sources include professional journals, Navy messages, meeting minutes,
and seminar outlines. On-line websites include the Office of Naval Research's S&T
Manning Affordability, Surface Combatant SC-21 and Surface Warfare Division N86.
Because of strict rules governing industry competition and information disclosure, the
DD-21 program office and/or N86 controlled access to the S&T website and release of
the DD-2 1 Operational Requirements Document and meeting minutes such as the Human
Systems Integration / Information Process Team (HSI/IPT).
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C. SUPPLEMENTARY INTERVIEWS
Six interviews were conducted via video teleconference between the Naval
Postgraduate School and NAVSEA Headquarters at Crystal City, Virginia. Four
individuals had direct ties to the DD-21 program office either through position or
association as consultants. J. Robert Bost serves as the Manning and Human System
Integration Department Head in the DD-21 program office. Rich Robbins, Ross Barker
and Al Rouse are consultants for DD-21 with special focus on manning, human
performance and personnel policies. The remaining two individuals were associated with
DD-21 through the office of the CNO and Director of Surface Warfare (N86). LCDR
Tom Conlon serves in the Human Integration section of the Acquisition Branch of Total
Force Manpower (N12). Greg Maxwell is a consultant for N86 in the DD-21 planning
office. All of the consultants interviewed are retired Surface Warfare Officers.
The individuals were selected according to their position within the program hierarchy,
their role in the development and implementation of optimized manning and a resistance
management plan and their availability. The interviews were conducted in thirty-minute
sessions, videotaped and later transcribed and analyzed for major themes. The DD-21
personnel were interviewed one-on-one, and the N86 personnel were interviewed
together. The interviewees were provided a copy of the questions (Appendices C and D)








Who are the stakeholders in optimized manning and what role will they
play in successful implementation?
2. What are the expected major sources of resistance?
3. What are the major facilitators for successful implementation of
optimized manning?
4. What are the specific plans for developing acceptance of optimized
manning among the stakeholders?
5. What are the relationships between DD-21 and the overall set of




This thesis has attempted to derive, from various sources, the answers to five general
questions regarding the process for building acceptance of the optimized manning concept
proposed for DD-21. In order to allow for a comparison between change management
theory and the resistance management plan suggested by the answers to those questions, a
data set containing briefing minutes, symposia transcriptions and semi-structured interview
responses was compiled. The following pages present the data that corresponds to each
of the research questions extracted from those various data sources.
A. MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS IN OPTIMIZED MANNING
1. BUPERS, NAVMAC and CNET
Figure 5.1 illustrates the list of major stakeholders present in the data. A member of
the DD-21 program office identified The Bureau ofNaval Personnel (BUPERS), the Chief
of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and the Navy Manpower Analysis Center
(NAVMAC) as three of his major stakeholders. Their respective interest in the manning
structure of DD-21 is defined by their role in the Navy's manpower acquisition,
development and distribution processes. More important to the success of optimized
manning, in the opinion of this DD-2 1 officer, is the resident expertise in each of these
commands that will help develop new methods for developing and managing a smaller
cadre of sailors for a new Surface Fleet.
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2. Surface Warfare Officer Leadership
That same DD-21 officer states that flag-level officers within the Surface Warfare
Community must lead a change in the traditionally risk averse mindset of the Surface
Fleet. He believes a reluctance to fail will be a serious obstacle to developing new
operating methods in support of a small crew, but that it can be overcome through strong
messages from leadership that innovation will demand a reasonable amount of risk.
Fig. 5.1 Stakeholder Map for Optimized Manning
Paraphrasing former CNO ADM. Boorda's belief that if a person does not fail
sometimes, then they are not trying hard enough, this subject states that the Navy can
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learn to accept reasonable failures in the name of innovation and learn from them. He
cites an incident on Smart Ship, where a human error caused a computer shut down that,
in turn, left the vessel dead in the water. The wrong thing to do, in his opinion, would
have been to hold the erring sailor up for discipline because the error was not malicious,
and no one was put in danger. Disciplinary action would have sent the wrong signal to the
very people on whom the success of the Smart Ship program depended for critical
evaluation and imaginative solutions. Furthermore, this person believes that if CAPT
Rushton, former Commanding Officer ofYORKTOWN, had not been promoted following
his tour on Smart Ship, it would have been a death knell for the program. The leadership
of his community rewarded CAPT Rushton for the risk he took in accepting command of
Smart Ship, and their action serves as a very powerful example to the rest of the Surface
Navy.
3. SURFLANT/SURFPAC and N86
A member of the CNO's manpower office identifies a group he calls "warfighters" that
have to be considered and satisfied in order for optimized manning to be successful. These
warfighters include N86, the Commanders Surface Fleet Atlantic and Surface Fleet
Pacific, and the regional Commanders in Chief who, he believes will be the ultimate
operational customers of these new ships. He explains that they are vitally interested in
the ability of a large ship with a small crew to carry out their assigned mission day after
day, month after month. They will want answers to questions about endurance and the
capacity to absorb damage and still remain on station.
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This interviewee believes that the concept of optimized manning is valuable if it saves
the Navy money. However, he warns that the reason we build and send ships to sea is to
put ordinance on target and that the warfighters will not buy DD-21 or optimized manning
if they don't believe it can deliver combat capability.
4. Waterfront Training Community
A consultant for DD-21 includes the waterfront training community, such as ATG and
other schoolhouse instructors ashore, on his list of important stakeholders. He explains
that, in the past, these have been the people with their checklists and strict operating
guidelines that have had a very skeptical reaction to technology. He claims the training
community has typically eliminated shipboard automated systems by injecting battle-
damage during evaluations, and then forcing the crew to revert to manual operation of
ship's systems without regard for the true capabilities of the technology.
He believes that the training community can begin to change its "checklist culture" if
they are given adequate incentive, and the move away from checklists is made a high-
priority by their leadership. In contrast to requiring an inflexible compliance with step-by-
step procedures, training and evaluation personnel should be allowed to educate Fleet
Operators in methods for risk-assessment and risk-acceptance. He admits that this is a
difficult objective for people who have grown up with volumes of procedures, but this
type of change will ultimately produce the new operating guidelines that will enable
optimized manning to succeed.
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5. The Fleet
All of the individuals interviewed indicated that it is the Fleet sailor who is the ultimate
stakeholder in DD-21 and its optimized crew structure, because it is he or she who will
have to do the maintenance, do the training, operate the consoles, clean the decks and
make the whole concept work. The general opinion of those interviewed is that
somewhere along the line, the sailors will have to come to believe in it too.
6. Marines
In the opinion of a program consultant, the leadership of the Marine Corps also has a
stake in the design and definition of DD-21 's capabilities because their Marines will be a
major customer for those capabilities. He claims that even though the ship will not carry
Marines, the land attack mission is in direct support of the Marine ashore and that they are
deeply interested in ability of this new Destroyer.
7. Contractors and Designers
A program officer thinks that the designers and contractors must also be included in
any list of stakeholders. He states that they are particularly important because they have
been given a greatly expanded role in the development of DD-21 and optimized manning.
In his opinion, they are vitally interested in optimized manning because successful design
and implementation of the manning concept will lead to, and support a successful ship
design that will, in turn, lead to a profitable shipbuilding contract.
8. Summary
The list of stakeholders presented here is not intended to be exhaustive. It is a
synthesis of the opinions of members of the DD-21 organization, and it indicates who
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those members believe to be vital to their efforts to implement optimized manning. Some
of the stakeholders named, such as the Fleet sailor, may be more obvious than others, such
as the Marine Corps. Additionally, two other organizations that were not named should
be included. They are the civilian leaders in SECNAV's staff, and the DD-21 organization
within NAVSEA. Neither was specifically mentioned in the data as a stakeholder, but
they clearly have a vital interest in the successful implementation of optimized manning.
B. EXPECTED SOURCES OF RESISTANCE
1. Cost of Automation and Technology
One contractor for DD-21 believes that many members of the Surface Navy will resist
implementing optimized manning because they will perceive the costs of the automation
and technology as being too high to be justified. He states that no one can say yet where
industry will discover and propose tradeoffs between technology cost and manpower costs
for this ship and consequently, there is a lot of uncertainty about the final size and
structure of both the DD-21 crew and its supporting infrastructure. In his opinion, such
uncertainty nearly always causes reluctance and fear, and those reactions within the Fleet
will slow implementation.
2. Navy Culture
Another consultant working to develop optimized manning thinks that the Navy's
culture does not favor unmanned spaces and consoles. His opinion that the Navy tends to
be very wary of automated controls was lent support by a Midshipman briefing at the
Naval Academy where nearly fifty percent of the questions referred to redundancy and
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manual backups for the automated systems proposed for DD-21 (PMS500M, 270CT98).
Interestingly, this interview subject says that people rarely question the ability of a single
fighter pilot to utilize immense automation including "fly-by-wire" controls to fly a
complex route at night and simultaneously drop bombs or fire missiles.
From the Fleet, a DD-21 program officer foresees two cultural issues that will
contribute to resistance. First, he explains that people in the Fleet have very deep-rooted
traditions and heroes. The image of Arliegh Burke on the bridge of his destroyer with
twenty sailors and officers around him fits the mental picture of Naval Warfare. The
thought of automating the most basic elements of the surface warship, such as the ship's
wheel, is at sharp odds with Fleet's self-image.
The second expected cause for concern in the Fleet is damage control, which this
interview respondent calls a very emotional issue. When someone starts talking about
cutting crew size, he states that folks start getting very worked up about the ability to fight
fires and flooding. They want to know where the goal of ninety-five came from and
exclaim that they can't do their work now with four hundred people, how will they do it
with only ninety-five and with probably more requirements?
A different consultant uses the term "well reasoned skepticism" when discussing
cultural resistance to the DD-2 1 manning proposals. By that he refers to a reaction based
on experience. He explains that people have seen the Navy design ships with certain
manpower requirements and then not provide adequate funding to "buy" those billets. A
given task will have been designed for certain number of sailors to perform, but the
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specific funding for that task will only pay for eighty to ninety percent of those sailors to
actually be onboard.
This interviewee also believes that people in the Fleet have experienced past manning
reduction efforts and remember that billets were often cut, but the system requirements for
operators and maintainers did not change by the same amount. This situation creates
undermanned crews, and he claims that these two problems have caused the Fleet to
become very skeptical where manning cuts are concerned. He points out that the Navy, as
a matter of policy, currently mans its ships at eighty to ninety percent of wartime
requirements, however, manpower shortages often prevent even that commitment from
being met. With DD-21, he states that the Navy is going to have to man to one hundred
percent of requirements, and that people are understandably skeptical that this will be
accomplished.
3. Legacy Systems
A third cause of resistance is what another consultant calls "legacy systems." Legacy
systems are pieces of equipment, such as engines, sonars or deck guns, that will not be
new to DD-21, but may be systems that already exist and were probably designed for and
outfitted on earlier ships. He claims that such systems, if they are included in a new ship,
commonly experience integration problems and, in the case of DD-21, will have been
designed for a different manning and operating philosophy. If not incorporated correctly,
such systems can cause pressures for increased manning and resistance to new operating
procedures.
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4. Designers and Sponsors
A program officer predicts there may be resistance from designers who have
historically not had to consider the human element early in the design of a naval vessel.
Up until now, they have designed the hull and hardware to meet the mission requirements,
and then fit in the people as the design required and/or allowed. With DD-21, he explains,
they will have to adjust their entire design philosophy to the total ownership cost concept
and justify every sailor onboard DD-21 from the beginning of the design effort.
He also expects to find some resistance within the sponsor at N86 because they will
have to change the way they test and evaluate a ship. Citing past methods, this interview
respondent explains that before DD-21, the approach to system design and acquisition was
to "stovepipe" the ship piecemeal. Now, the platform sponsor will have to adjust to a
total system design, testing and acceptance concept. The individual parts such as radars
and engines may be rolled out independently, but they will be designed as integral elements
of the whole system and their individual success or failure will depend upon the success or
failure of the whole system. In both of these cases, this respondent believed that creating
a new way of doing things would serve as a clear source of apprehension and resistance.
5. Tendency to Oversell a Program
Lastly, a consultant claims that the Navy tends to "oversell" new programs. He says
that the Navy has to be careful not to tell people that they are building a $10 billion ship
for only $1 billion. Exaggerated claims of cost savings and capabilities will be hard to fill
and, if not met, they will provide ammunition to those who doubt the entire concept of
optimized manning.
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An interviewee summarized these potential sources of resistance. He stated that
people are reluctant to change unless they have a reason to change, and he has listed six
mindset roadblocks that specifically work against automation technology. They are: (1) it
needs manual backup, (2) it needs increased maintenance, (3) it should be avoided because
operator tasks become tedious, (4) digital automation is unsuitable for the naval
environment, (5) fewer people will lead to a reduced damage control capability, and (6) it
is too expensive. These six roadblocks do not include every possible source of resistance
but they do paint a picture of the anticipated reasons people have for believing that an
innovation will not work.
C. FACILITATORS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMIZED MANNING
1. Emphasize Human Factors in Design Process
Two members of the DD-21 program office have stated that, from a high-level
perspective, the inclusion of human operators in the system design process is a critical
factor for the success of optimized manning. They believe that, in the past, the Navy has
failed to fully address the role of the human, and the requirements for workload sharing
between human and machine until after the machine had already taken form. As a
consequence, they both contend that these systems were not designed to support reduced
manning.
In contrast to past reduced manning programs, two interview respondents claim that
the design effort for DD-21 is different from nearly everything that has been done before.
They state that it is a top-down industry driven process that will consider the role of
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human interaction with the ship's technology from the very start. For this ship, manpower
and its costs have moved from an afterthought position to the forefront where their design
and consideration are integral the success of the entire program. Another interviewee
states that if Surface Warfare does this right from the start and includes human beings in
the design process, that they will make the lives of DD-21's officers and crew much easier,
while at the same time meeting cost and performance objectives.
2. Senior SWO and Civilian Leadership Lead the Change Effort
A DD-21 consultant believes that the success of optimized manning depends heavily
on senior Surface Officers leading a change in the mindset that people are a relatively
cheap solution to problems. He claims that the idea of sailors being inexpensive has
allowed past design efforts to cling to manpower intensive options. But, in the case of
DD-21, he believes the Navy no longer has that luxury. One reason, he cites, is that
national demographics will no longer support the manning levels required by design
methods of the past and the Surface Fleet can no longer afford to maintain its current
manpower requirements. A robust economy full of career options and a shrinking pool of
seventeen to twenty-one year olds are a reality that must be dealt with. This consultant
states that the fiscal opportunity cost of manning is prohibitive right now and the Navy
spends too much money on manpower if it is going to make investments in new
technology and equipment.
A retired member of the N86 staff also believes that the success of optimized manning
depends on the reaction of Surface Navy leaders to environmental pressures. He states
that there are several factors in today's changing environment that require examination,
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including budget and personnel shortages, antiquated operating and manning methods and
a general lack of a monetary cushion for unforeseen contingencies. He claims that such
examination is ongoing in the form of the CNO's Inter-Deployment Training Cycle
reductions, the pay and retirement debate before Congress and optimized manning itself.
He believes that senior officers have acknowledged the real danger that the Surface Navy
could be weakened in the future without some major changes now.
Another retired officer, now consultant, agrees that leadership is critical for
implementation and he claims that the Secretary of the Navy is fully behind the effort to
revolutionize the design and acquisition of warships beginning with the DD-21 program.
He says the CNO is also heavily committed to the optimized manning concept in company
with the Director of Surface Warfare (N86) who established the original manning target of
ninety-five. All of the interview respondents concur with the need for high-level
involvement, stating that the active participation and full backing of senior civilian and
naval leadership is vital to the success of any significant manning reduction effort.
3. Redesign Personnel and Training Infrastructure
One interviewee also named a redesigned Navy personnel and training infrastructure as
a critical requirement for successful implementation of optimized manning. He believes
that a new system must be designed that can adequately plan for and support the
requirements of DD-21 's crew structure while at the same time support existing
manpower requirements as long as they last. He points out that, for a time, there will in
effect be two Fleets operating side by side that must be able to function and be supported
as one.
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4. Design Maintenance, Reliability and Interoperability Up-Front
Finally, two of the individuals interviewed stated that there must be a revolutionary
change in maintenance, reliability and total system interoperability. Damage control,
periodic maintenance, corrosion control and overall system reliability must, they say, be
designed into the total system up-front in order to enable significant changes in the way
the Navy mans its ships. Remote sensing, automation, new protective coatings and space
age materials are part of the answer. The rest of the answer must be found if the goal of
ninety-five or anything near it is going to become a reality
They state further that the design of ship's systems has traditionally tended to consist
of separate "stovepipe" projects that often lacked compatibility with either new or existing
systems. These characteristics of traditional system development have severely hampered
past efforts to reduce crew size onboard Navy ships and changes will aid the development
of an optimized crew.
D. PLANS FOR DEVELOPING ACCEPTANCE OF OPTIMIZED MANNING
1. Not Complete, but Underway
During his interview, a former member of the N86 staff stated that, as far as he knows,
a rational system or process for the mitigation of resistance to the optimized manning
concept does not yet exist. He says a plan is being developed by the program office that
will address resistance to optimized manning, and that it will be more formal than anything
that now exists. A DD-21 program officer also says that there is no plan yet for building
acceptance for optimized manning. However, he claims that he and another member of
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the program office have one in mind that will reduce skepticism by using a series of tests
and demonstrations to prove that optimized manning can work. He believes that this kind
of plan will reduce apprehension within the Fleet operators because it will reduce the
perceived risk associated with the proposals for reduced crew sizes.
2. Prototypes, Demonstrations and Simulations
The plan proposed by two individuals from the DD-21 program office includes
prototyping, modeling, test programs, simulation of different functions, and some
demonstrations both at sea and ashore. The exact definition of their plan will depend on
the recommendations of industry regarding which aspects of DD-21 are best simulated
vice being modeled or demonstrated. They explain that industry is conducting the
feasibility research in support of optimized manning, and that it is just too early for the
program office to know what their recommendations will be. They do believe that there
are ways of reducing the perceived risk of reduced manpower, such as at-sea
demonstration of engineering control or simulation of new console technology that will
then reduce the associated fear and skepticism. These two interviewees say that they
intend to include as many modeling and demonstration elements as possible in the
implementation plan.
3. HSI/TPT
Another interview respondent states that the current absence of a smooth process plan
does not mean that there are not efforts already underway aimed at building acceptance of
DD-21. He explains that there are several initiatives ongoing with that very goal.
NAVSEA PMS-500, the DD-21 program office, is sponsoring a Manning / Human
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Systems Integration Information Process Team (HSI/TPT) to work on the issue of building
acceptance for optimized manning. This group consists of seventy to one hundred
members of the various stakeholder groups including CNET, BUPERS, N86, NAVMAC,
the U. S. Coast Guard, and Military Sealift Command (MSC). They are divided into three
functional areas: policy, personnel management and training. According to the IPT
charter, one of the goals is the identification of design requirements, technological
innovations and organizational changes that will enable the DD-21 program to meet its
manning goals and develop acceptance of optimized manning (PMS500M, 1998).
4. Issues Delineation
According to a consultant for N86, the process for building acceptance, however
undefined, is indeed underway. He states that the Surface Warfare Director's office is
driving an effort to get top SWO leaders together to discuss the operational and cultural
issues that will be affected by the changes proposed for DD-21. He says that with the
active cooperation of ADM. Mullen (N86), there has already been a meeting of Surface
Admirals attempting to identify important topics related to optimized manning in order to
facilitate further discussion on how any proposed changes could be accomplished. The
first such meeting took place in late 1998 with five one-star Admirals debating which
operating principles and traditions should be examined and possibly changed in support of
optimized manning. These issues included acceptable risk, command relationships,
operational philosophy, personnel rotation and Surface Warfare Officer community
management. This interviewee stated that follow-on meetings will be scheduled as the
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need arises in the opinion of NAVSEA and/or N86, and that such meetings can be
recommended by industry consultants.
5. Education
In addition to these meetings, all of the individuals interviewed stated that there is an
ongoing education process being initiated by the DD-2 1 hierarchy, both program officers
and consultants, that utilizes briefings, symposia, journals and messages that are designed
to get accurate information out to both civilian and military leaders of the Surface
Community. Two of the interviewees explained that there is also an ongoing self-
education process in which flag officers at Navy Headquarters and in commands deeply
interested in DD-21, such as SURFLANT and SURFPAC, are contacting members of the
DD-21 office seeking information on optimized manning. One consultant believes that
these efforts to find answers to questions about DD-21 shows that the Surface Warfare
Community as a whole is developing a willingness to talk about and accept some very
dramatic changes in the way they have thought about and done their business.
Another consultant believes there is a critical need to identify and utilize credible
people in the education process. He thinks that these would be people who know the
audience, and are known by them as reliable experts, so they will be working from a
position of respect and trust. An example of such a person would be a Warrant or Chief
Petty Officer with a breadth of at-sea experience. They should, in his opinion, have a very
good idea of what that audience will be thinking so they can anticipate questions and
concerns. These educators will have to be credible with the audience on any particular
58
topic under examination because they will have to convince them that the Navy is not
going to repeat the mistakes of the past.
6. Waterfront Information Process Team
A member of the CNO manpower office believes that the opinions, concerns and
skepticism of the Fleet operating core are hard to measure because, he says, that these
individuals are busy with their day-to-day duties. He proposes setting up a "waterfront
IPT" with various groups from the waterfront community including SURFLANT and
SURFPAC, ATG, Squadron officers and a number of ship's captains to examine questions
and concerns, take recommendations and begin the process of building acceptance of the
optimized manning concept. This IPT would utilize Fleet input conferences, Surface
Warfare Commanders Conferences, presentations to the Naval Academy, Naval
Postgraduate School and the Surface Warfare Officer School as educational and feedback
opportunities to begin addressing concerns and building acceptance with the Fleet
operators.
7. Plan Of Action and Milestones (POAM)
With regard to the existence of a formal plan for building acceptance of optimized
manning, a consultant in the PMS-500M personnel working-group states his group is
developing a Plan Of Action and Milestones (POAM) for the DD-21 program office, but
adds that the details are not yet available. However, he explains that to deal effectively
with resistance, the effort will require four elements: a formal plan, candid discussion with
the Fleet, a recognition and willingness to learn from past mistakes and the process must
engage credible people in the eyes of the Fleet operators.
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A consultant in the policy development working-group States that a process for
building acceptance must also include the element of continuous communication and
engagement with critical stakeholders. He points to what he sees as a frequently
overlooked problem with regard to DD-21 and its largely military stakeholder base. That
problem, in his opinion, stems from the fact that military personnel currently engaged with
designers and planners usually transfer every two years, and therefore will not be there
when the ship begins construction or first puts to sea. This situation leads to a lack of
long-term stability of opinion concerning optimized manning in any particular office and is
compounded by the fact that there are very few civilians in some offices that are critical to
the effort to address resistance. Consequently, he believes, the effort to institutionalize
optimized manning and the new operating concepts that will accompany it must be a
continuous process of engagement and interaction to develop long-term commitment until
the ship is operating at sea.
8. Timeline
Finally, A DD-21 program officer, in his interview, laid out a brief timeline for the full
acceptance of optimized manning. He believes that it will take a generation, some twenty
years, to affect the cultural changes necessary to build full acceptance. He explains that
when the Navy went from sails to steam engines, there was a transition period that saw the
use of both systems until steam had proven its reliability, and, that the transition continued
until those officers who had served a long time under sail had retired from the service. He
says Smart Ship was the triggering event that started this twenty-year clock. Furthermore,
he thinks that it will take three to five years of hard work to get enough key stakeholders
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to accept the idea of a small crew handling a large ship, and to then help design and
implement an optimized crew for DD-21.
E. DD-21 IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING THE
SURFACE FLEET
1. Smart Ship
When asked about the relevance of Smart Ship to DD-21, a member of the DD-21
office said that he does not believe the experience and example of Smart Ship have yet
been totally embraced by the Navy. He cites editorial journal articles and negative
reactions at Smart Ship briefings as evidence that there is still skepticism regarding the
ability of YORKTOWN to serve in a front-line capacity. He thinks that there are
important lessons to be learned from the implementation of Smart Ship technology, and
the accompanying effort to build acceptance of it.
In the opinion of this interviewee, the reductions on YORKTOWN, amounting to a
ten to eleven percent reduction in crew size, were minor when compared to the sixty to
seventy-five percent reductions proposed for DD-21. This person believes the challenge
for N86 and NAVSEA is to take the Smart Ship success and use it address the resistance
to optimized manning. In view of that need, the HSI/IPT has been instructed to design
and conduct proof of concept demonstrations for reduced manning technology and to
provide for early operational testing by applying lessons learned from Smart Ship, Smart
Base, Arsenal Ship, and "experienced warfighters" (PMS500M, 1998).
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2. Evolutionary Steps
One department head in the DD-21 program expressed disappointment at the
cancellation of Arsenal Ship because, he believed, that program would have provided an
opportunity to demonstrate at sea, many of the technologies and procedures that will be
required for DD-2 1 . He states that Smart Ship, Arsenal Ship and DC-ARM can be used
to make the leap to DD-21 less dramatic. These programs can, in his opinion, provide the
basis for an incremental change process that would create less resistance than a single,
more radical change.
A consultant for DD-21 agrees that the current set of change initiatives will serve as
stepping stones that help demonstrate to the Fleet that the concept of optimized manning
is achievable. The success of these programs, he says, helps build confidence and reduce
fear and uncertainty. Two other interview respondents say that neither DD-21 nor Smart
Ship can be looked at in isolation. They claim that these programs represent the beginning
of a series of changes that are coming to the Surface Fleet in the next ten to fifteen years.
Regarding the relationship between DD-21 and the other changes, they say that a
failure of Smart Ship or DC-ARM does not necessarily promise a failure of DD-21, but
that such setbacks would make the job of designing and implementing it much harder.
They believe that if Smart Ship or some other manpower reduction initiative is a success,
it only enhances the efforts of the program office to get people to accept optimized
manning.
A consultant in the policy working-group claims that the relationship between the
programs is stronger than one that merely provides feedback. He believes that if Smart
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Ship, DC-ARM and the other initiatives aimed at reducing manpower fail, then that failure
will produce a tremendous mindset obstacle within the Fleet operating core, and there will
be no point in going after the DD-21 reductions. He also sees these other programs as
evolutionary steps that are needed to accomplish the revolutionary reductions embodied in
DD-21 . He states however, that if they fail, then the Navy may as well forget reaching for
the more revolutionary changes of optimized manning.
3. Operating Philosophy Changes
A retired Surface Warfare Captain believes that the three programs, Smart Ship, DC-
ARM and changes to the IDTC, represent the current state of the Navy: fewer people,
fewer ships and fewer dollars. He thinks that it will be hard to convince officers and
sailors who grew up in the Reagan years with plenty of money, weapons, personnel and
training opportunities that the Fleet can maintain readiness with fewer of all these things.
To him, the challenge for leadership will be to get these officers and sailors, who are used
to having plenty of nearly every resource, use to operating in austere times while still
meeting their mission requirements. These manning reduction programs complement DD-
21 very well and will, in his opinion, challenge the Fleet sailor to find innovative solutions
to problems that had traditionally been overcome with manpower.
When asked about the importance of the success of these programs however, this
consultant has a very different point of view from the others. He thinks the presence of
these programs is more important than their rate of success. The fact that they are out
there, he believes, tells folks that the Navy is attempting to find a different way of doing
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business and this knowledge will drive the search for fresh ideas and help the effort to
build acceptance of DD-21.
4. Summary
In summary, the majority opinion among the individuals interviewed is that Smart Ship
and the other changes underway in the Surface Community will provide valuable lessons
for the design and implementation of optimized manning. All of these initiatives can be
seen as incremental steps in a greater change process that includes DD-21 and is leading to
a Surface Navy that is leaner in terms of manpower and more technically efficient. The
interview respondents do not agree about the effects of a failure in any one program on
DD-21, but they do agree that the group of changes represents a change in mindset about
manpower philosophy.
F. CHANGE LEADER CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the five research questions, the interview subjects were asked to provide
their opinions regarding the choice of a change leader for optimized manning. One
program officer said that the DD-21 planning process is still in the very early stages, and
that the position of change manager has not yet been defined. With regard to the POAM
being developed, however, he states that such a plan will go from the manning department
office to the program director for approval and probably then back to the manning
department for implementation, in concert with the other DD-2 1 department heads.
In contrast, three of the consultants interviewed said that the platform sponsor at N86
should have the critical role in implementing the entire DD-21 program. They do not
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think that the program office or any contractor can fill the role of change leader because
the Director of Surface Warfare (N86) is the center of gravity of the entire Surface
Warfare community, and must therefore drive the commitment for the concept of
optimized manning.
With yet another viewpoint, a single consultant states that the acquisition community,
or possibly even industry should be in charge of any implementation plan. The latter
preference is due to the fact that industry is leading the total project design effort and is
therefore in the position of making most of the recommendations. Industry is, in his
opinion, in a natural leadership position due to the fact that the Navy will only buy DD-21
if industry can prove that it works. In this individual's view, industry will be working in
their own best interests by insuring that resistance and skepticism are adequately dealt
with.
G. SUMMARY
This Chapter summarized the data findings corresponding to the five research
questions. A stakeholder map was created that includes various members of the Navy
military and civilian chains of authority, DD-21 contractors, designers and sponsors,
Marine Corps leaders and Fleet operators. Some potential sources of resistance and
skepticism, such as cost, culture and legacy systems, were identified, as were some
facilitators of optimized manning implementation. The interviewees all agreed that senior
Surface Warfare Officers must take a leading role in any effort to change the operating
philosophy of the Surface Fleet. There was also general agreement that the design process
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for DD-21 must be driven by criteria of reduced manning, and must also address
maintainability and reliability at the very beginning.
Plans for the implementation of optimized manning are not yet complete, but are in
development within the DD-21 program office. When complete, that plan should, in the
opinion of the interview respondents, include simulation, modeling and demonstration
elements. The designers of the plan intend to include lessons learned from Smart Ship,
DC-ARM and other manpower initiatives underway in the Navy. Finally, the need for a
change leader who will be responsible for coordinating the efforts to build acceptance of
optimized manning is acknowledged; though there is no agreement on where that
leadership rests. The next Chapter contains a comparison of the data with change
management theory. It also contains some recommendations for the implementation of
optimized manning as well as suggested further studies.
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This final Chapter analyzes the data in terms of change management theory
described in Chapter HI. The purpose of comparing findings from this exploratory study
to theory is to assist DD-21 planners in developing a formal resistance management plan
specifically targeted at building acceptance of optimized manning. In summary, this
Chapter draws conclusions based on the study, makes recommendations to assist planners
and contains suggestions for further research.
A. DATA ANALYSIS
1. Need for Change
The change management models discussed in Chapter HI provide a framework for the
development of a coordinated resistance management plan. According to Walton (1987),
one of the elements related to an organization's ability to innovate is its guiding model or
vision for the future state. In the data, there are statements by members of the Navy's
leadership regarding the future direction of Surface Warfare and its manning strategy. The
CNO, N86 and members of NAVSEA have clearly stated an intention to dramatically
reduce shipboard manpower, based on the need to reduce life-cycle costs, and the
opportunity afforded by automation technology to accomplish the Surface Fleet's mission
with fewer sailors at sea.
With regard to determining the need for change, Beckhard and Harris (1987) state that
an organization's executives must determine how much control they have over the
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conditions that drive a change movement. The DD-21 Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) indicates senior Surface Navy leaders believe economic necessity and
the need to reduce ship life-cycle costs has limited their choice about whether or not to
change the Navy's manpower philosophy. They seem convinced that current manning
processes are unaffordable and present DD-21 as the next step toward a future Fleet of
combatants operated by crews whose size and composition have been optimized for the
requirements of cost and mission. While the final form of this vision may not yet be
defined, the fact that the future will be a radical departure from the past seems
unquestionable.
According to Beckhard and Harris (1987), Navy leaders must determine both how to
manage a change and whether or not to initiate that change in the first place.
Communicating the answers to those questions to the organization's operators and other
stakeholders is another key step in the innovative process. Successful implementation
depends on the operators and implementers throughout the organization appreciating the
need for change and having a clear understanding of the proposed future state.
Misunderstanding and lack of commitment in these areas contributes to fear and
resistance.
2. Change Leader
Tichy and Devanna (1990) define the transformational leader as someone who leads
the effort to define the need for change, create new visions, mobilize commitment to the
innovation and ultimately transform the organization. AnsofF and McDonnell (1990)
describe four management archetypes, planner, entrepreneur, leader and administrator,
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that are required for the successful planning and implementation of change. The planning
and entrepreneur roles are analytical, methodical and future oriented, and they are
important for the definition of the need to change and the future state. However, the
entrepreneur seeks a new line of business opportunities where the planner only seeks to
improve within the current set of business goals. The leader role is critical to
implementation and demands the ability to judge character and potential, communicate and
motivate in order to identify allies and enemies of a change and develop commitment
among the stakeholders. The administrator has the controlling tasks of tracking progress,
identifying potential trouble spots and developing corrective action to allow the
implementation process to continue. The last two roles can be termed the change leader
and the change manager respectively, and according to Beckhard and Harris (1987), these
roles may or may not be vested within the same person or position depending on the
complexity of the innovation, and the abilities ofthe individual.
Several of the interview respondents indicated that the process for the development
and implementation of optimized manning does not yet have such a manager/leader.
When asked to identify a potential change leadership position within the program
hierarchy, the interviewees expressed widely varying opinions. Those opinions ranged
from the manning department head of the DD-21 program to an unidentified position
within the N86 hierarchy to an equally unidentified position among the DD-21 industry
contractors.
Furthermore, there was no sense among the interviewees of a near term requirement
for a leader and many stated that a change leader and/or manager would be needed at
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some time during the change process, but none indicated that such a billet needed filling
now. With regard to the change manager roles defined by Ansoffand McDonnell (1990),
the DD-2 1 program officer claimed during his interview that many of those tasks such as
identifying trouble spots and developing corrective action were being carried out by the
four manning department working groups. However, he also said that no specific
manager for these efforts, with authority beyond the working groups themselves, has been
officially designated. None of the interviewees described a leadership or management role
that fits the entrepreneur archetype. A consultant for N86 stated that the challenge for
DD-21 planners is to develop new and efficient ways to meet the Navy's traditional
requirement of hitting a target with ordinance. Such a role fits Ansoff and McDonnell's
(1990) definition of planner vice entrepreneur.
Clearly, DD-21 and optimized manning are still in the early design phase, and have
only begun to take steps into the transition phase. With regard to the selection of a
change leader, a member of the program office says that the process has not yet gotten
that far. However, the successful transition process described by Beckhard and Harris
(1987) requires a leader/manager who has clout, respect and interpersonal skills for
dealing with the organization's internal and external stakeholders. Because DD-21 has no
transition leader or manager, there is no one playing the roles described in the literature.
Based on the comments of the interviewees, there does not appear to be a central monitor
of the various on-going manning initiatives. There is no single change management
position within the hierarchy of DD-21 looking for valuable lessons to be applied to the
program, nor a single clearinghouse of opinion and feedback from the stakeholders. Nor
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is there a single change leadership position coordinating an overarching effort to develop
understanding and acceptance of optimized manning among the stakeholders. Manning
department working groups and the HSI/IPT are carrying out some change leadership
and/or management roles, such as trouble identification and corrective action definition.
However, these DD-21 program elements do not appear to meet the requirements of
clout, respect and communication skills of a change leader, nor the change manager
requirements for insightful decision-making and control called for by Beckhard and Harris
(1987) and Ansoffand McDonnell (1990).
3. Stakeholder Assessment
Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) state that identification of key stakeholders who will
either support or resist an innovation is a critical part of managing the change process.
Each of the interview subjects defined a set of individuals and/or groups as stakeholders of
optimized manning, however, the makeup and range of the stakeholder sets seem to vary
with the background of the person defining the set. For example, a DD-21 program
officer included BUPERS, NAVMAC and CNET in his list of major stakeholders, but an
active-duty member of the CNO's manpower office listed operational level commanders
such as SURFLANT, SURFPAC, and regional commanders in chief, while a consultant
included the Marine Corps. This diversity in the lists of stakeholders is important and it
reinforces the importance of having breadth and variety among the participants in the
implementation planning process. All of the stakeholders identified should be
acknowledged and their respective interests and concerns reflected in specific planning and
implementation modules.
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The stakeholders identified by the various data can be generally described as internal
or external relative to the DD-21 program office at NAVSEA. Internal stakeholders
include Fleet sailors afloat, the waterfront training and inspecting organizations,
maintenance organizations ashore, Surface Warfare Officers, N86 and operational
commanders, and the Navy personnel management organization. External stakeholders
include contractors, designers, and civilian leaders such as SECNAV and Congress.
The data, however, do not indicate that there has been a systematic process for
stakeholder identification or validation as suggested by Beckhard and Harris (1987). They
recommend that, in addition to "intuitive political judgement," an analysis of the
organization and its environment be conducted to determine which subsystems, individuals
and groups must be committed to the change effort for it to succeed. The stakeholders
listed in the data do not appear to be the product of such an analysis.
4. Critical Mass
In addition to identifying critical stakeholders, Beckhard and Harris (1987)
recommend that change managers determine the critical mass within each stakeholder
group that is needed for the successful implementation of an innovation. They admit,
however, that it may be impossible to quantify in exact figures, the number of people
required for successful implementation, and that a study of the interests and influence of
each stakeholder may define its critical mass. With regard to optimized manning, the data
do not show a process for defining and validating the critical mass ofthe stakeholders.
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5. Behavioral Diagnosis
Building a launching platform for a change initiative is, according to Ansoff and
McDonnell (1990), essential whenever a change is expected to encounter resistance.
Platform construction begins with a series of diagnoses intended to determine first, the
strategic problems that are creating a need for change, then, the potential for a given
innovation to encounter resistance, and finally the severity of resistance and its likely
sources. The last of these, the behavioral diagnosis, is intended to find out which parts of
and organization will be affected by an innovation, which stakeholders will support the
change, which will not and why.
Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) state that stakeholder groups are likely to resist a
change if it threatens their power, violates their norms, is based on a need the group
believes to be irrelevant or is based on a model of reality that is different from the group's
reality. Tichy and Devanna (1990), state that resistance will occur when the change runs
against a group's habit or inertia, causes a loss of predictability and a fear of the unknown
or if the sunk costs of the current system are perceived to be lower that the costs of the
new system. In each case, the authors provide a broad set of categories for possible
sources of resistance, and recommend a systematic effort to define the applicable set of
dissatisfiers in a given innovation effort.
In contrast to the analytical process for determining potential sources of resistance
recommended by authors such as Ansoff and McDonnell (1990), the data obtained from
the interviewees tends to be anecdotal with regard to the identification of specific sources
and reasons for resistance. For example, a contractor working on human/system
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integration believes the cost of automation will be an obstacle to the application of
technology. Another consultant, who is a member of the NAVSEA PMS-500 personnel
policy working group, thinks that the Navy has often over-sold new systems, and when
the inflated expectations are not met, the stakeholders react negatively to any other
proposed changes.
Like the sets of stakeholders, the sources of resistance seem to vary by individual
perspective, with those people higher in the chain of authority having a broader and less
detailed set of potential dissatisfiers. None of the individuals interviewed described a set
of resistance sources the extended beyond their own background and expertise. A senior
program officer may have a full appreciation for the habits and inertia of the Navy's
command hierarchy, however, a failure to fully describe the likely fear of the unknown
within the Fleet operators may indicate a weakness in the resistance diagnosis. Such a
limitation suggests the need for a more systematic investigation of stakeholder interests,
concerns and reactions to optimized manning in order to ensure their needs are being
addressed.
While not systematically derived, the data do contain numerous expected sources of
resistance. A consultant for the DD-21 office thinks that from within the Fleet, cultural
issues such as wariness of unmanned spaces and unmanned control consoles may
contribute to skepticism and resistance. A consultant for N86 believes the fear of
potentially undermanned and ineffectual damage control parties is already provoking
hostile reactions from many members of the operating core. A DD-21 program officer
expects designers to resist a new process that requires the inclusion of humans as a Key
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Performance Parameter. He also thinks that there may be some officers working with the
platform sponsor who will be skeptical of a new systems design and evaluation method
that is in sharp contrast to the traditional "stovepipe" approach. Skeptical comments
made by a Naval Academy Midshipman who called optimized manning "a nice fairy tale"
and Anthony DiGiorgio (1998) who warns of a cultural distrust of automation provide
further indicators of possible resistance from both current and future Fleet operators.
Responses of the interviewees tend to fall in line with Tichy and Devanna's (1990)
taxonomy of sources of resistance. A wariness of unmanned engineering spaces correlates
with resistance to change that runs against a group's habits. Fear of potentially ineffectual
damage-control organizations is a clear fear of the unknown, and resistance to the
potentially high-cost of automation is closely related to the sunk-cost theory described
earlier.
What the data do not show is a coordinated process for the identification and
validation of the widely varied potential sources of resistance. The many causes of
resistance that were identified in the data appear to be the product of the professional
experience and observations of program officers and contractors. The breadth of the list
of potential dissatisfiers appears to depend on the breadth of experience of the originator
rather than a broadly categorized, systematic process of the type recommended by Ansoff
and McDonnell (1990).
6. Activity Planning
Beckhard and Harris (1987) describe an activity plan as an element of the transition
phase that specifies critical events leading to the successful implementation of an
75
innovation. The data do not contain any specific components of an activity plan, however,
the individuals interviewed were asked to identify facilitators of successful implementation
of optimized manning. While the interviewees may not have used the same terminology as
Beckhard and Harris, their answers generally fit the definition of an activity plan, because
they identify those events that are important to the success or failure of optimized
manning.
The data indicate four predominant factors that can be classified as critical to the
successful implementation of optimized manning: (1) leadership's reaction to the need for
change, (2) a design process that integrates the human operator, (3) leadership
involvement in change planning, and (4) a whole system concept for the future Fleet.
A majority of the interview respondents stated that senior leaders of the Surface
Warfare Community must react decisively to the budget and personnel pressures that are
defining the need to implement optimized manning in DD-21. Budget pressures are
dictating a reduction in the number of officers and sailors the Navy can afford to put
onboard a ship over its expected life. National demographics are dictating a reduction in
the number of recruits that are available from the population, and therefore, a reduction in
the total number of personnel available within the service. The interviewees stated that
optimized manning depends heavily on a clear acknowledgement of these circumstances,
and the resultant need for a new manning philosophy. The data indicate that the CNO,
N86 and other senior leaders have indeed acknowledged both these pressures and the need
to change.
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According to the data, the second factor required for successful implementation of
optimized manning is a design process for DD-21 systems that includes the human
operator. The concept of optimized manning is, according to a DD-21 program officer,
achievable only if industry analyzes and defines the appropriate roles of both humans and
technology at the very start of the program. That program officer and others in the DD-
21 office state that the DD-21 program is in fact including the human as a Key
Performance Parameter in the systems design process, and that process will make possible
the changes called for by the first factor.
The third factor identified in the data is the involvement of Navy leadership
stakeholders, including N86, SURFLANT and SURFPAC, BUPERS, CNET and others,
throughout the entire planning and implementation of optimized manning. These
stakeholders possess expertise in areas such as sea/shore rotation planning and in-port
duty section requirements that are critical to the development of a new manning
philosophy. All of the individuals interviewed stated that the application of this expertise
is a vital step in the process to develop and implement optimized manning.
The fourth facilitator is an inclusive factor that contains three elements combined to
form a whole system concept to support optimized manning. This facilitator includes
redesigned personnel acquisition, allocation and training systems, redefined ship
maintenance and reliability concepts and a complete systems approach, vice a "stovepipe"
approach to hardware/software development. Taken as a group, these elements form the
basis for a whole system concept that links the ship's design with the design of its
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supporting infrastructure. The data seem to indicate that this is the intent of the DD-21
organization.
Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) state that any effort to implement change must include
plans to develop adequate capability to support the new organizational strategy as
indicated in Figure 3.3. This planning/implementation process is intended to help
institutionalize the change by ensuring the strategy is not enacted prior to there being
adequate support infrastructure. In the case of optimized manning, such a failure might
occur if the re-structured crew of DD-21 was introduced with a without adequate changes
being made in the personnel assignment and training systems. The whole systems
approach described by the interviewees appears to address this potential problem.
7. Commitment Planning
A commitment plan is a change management process devised to secure support and
cooperation from the stakeholders who are most critical to the successful implementation
of an innovation. The process described by Beckhard and Harris (1987) requires the
development of a plan for gaining the commitment of the critical mass. They state that
resistance to any change is normal, and is usually a fixed-bias or "frozen" attitude against a
new method or innovation. They claim that a properly designed commitment plan will
"unfreeze" the attitudes of the stakeholders by creating a situation that is neutral, so that
no one is forced to commit their opinions before they have accepted the innovation.
One strategy for unfreezing attitudes presented by Beckhard and Harris (1987) is an
education intervention. This intervention is intended to help people understand the details
and implications of an innovation in order to reduce apprehension and build acceptance.
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The data present a series of articles, briefings, symposia, and demonstrations that are
aimed at education and information sharing between members of the DD-21 team and
their stakeholders. The subjects also described manning Information Process Teams (IPT)
and working groups, whose charters call for the discovery of methods for improving
cooperation with, and the mitigation of resistance within the Fleet. Overall, these projects
seem to represent the outline of a process for gaining input from Fleet operators regarding
their concerns and innovative ideas, and to provide those operators with information on
DD-21 and optimized manning.
Another commitment strategy described by Beckhard and Harris (1987) is role
modeling. In such a strategy, the executives of an organization incorporate elements of an
innovation into their own lives, and therefore prove to the stakeholders that they are
themselves committed to success of the change. Smart Ship, DC-ARM and the IDTC
workload reductions can be classified as elements of a role modeling strategy. By
accepting the risks of more automation and fewer officers and sailors at sea in
YORKTOWN and fighting fires in SHADWELL, leaders of the Surface Navy are
demonstrating a commitment to a new manpower philosophy. By reducing the number of
inspections and passing more responsibility for readiness to squadron commanders and
ship captains, they are demonstrating an acceptance of the risk inherent in a new operating
philosophy. According to Beckhard and Harris (1987), such actions prove to the
operators and other stakeholders that the change activity is a priority for leadership, and it
will usually, therefore, encounter less resistance.
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These programs and their relationship with DD-21 may also enhance the rate of
adoption of optimized manning by playing the part of the variables Everett Rogers (1995)
describes as the "perceived attributes" of an innovation. These variables are: the relative
advantage of the new system over the old, the compatibility of the new system with the
current structures and culture of the organization, the complexity of the new system in
relation to the structure of the organization and skills of its members, the trialability of the
new system prior to implementation, and the observability of those trials to the
organization's stakeholders. Smart Ship, DC-ARM and other manning innovations can fill
the need for such variables in the effort to build acceptance of optimized manning by
proving the legitimacy of automation technology and small crews in a naval organization.
These projects are being conducted on Navy ships, by the Navy and consequently, they
should validate the relevancy and compatibility of the DD-21 concept, assuming their trials
are observed to be adequate by Fleet operators.
The data contain references to an ongoing effort within the DD-21 program office to
produce a resistance management POAM. The details of that plan are not yet available
because they are still preliminary, however, there are many potential elements within the
DD-21 data for the creation of a commitment plan as described by Beckhard and Harris
(1987).
8. Monitoring / Feedback System
The last element of the commitment plan described by Beckhard and Harris (1987) is a
monitoring system to assess the progress of the effort to build acceptance and
commitment. Such a system is intended to enable those in charge of the process to know
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if their plans for mitigating resistance are successful. While there are a number of projects,
both planned and underway, that are aimed at sharing information and collecting the ideas
and concerns of the operating core, there does not yet appear to be a complete system for
providing the continuous feedback recommended by Beckhard and Harris
The most obvious feedback elements contained in the data make use of briefings and
conferences such as the Fleet input conference, the SWO Commanders Conference and
briefings at the Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School and Surface Warfare Officers
School. The interview respondents describe these events as avenues for innovative input
from Fleet operators to the DD-21 office, and as a medium for the dissemination of details
of optimized manning. However, these projects do not completely fit the requirement for
a dedicated mechanism for the supply of continuing feedback between the planners and
implementers of optimized manning and their various stakeholders as recommended by
Beckhard and Harris (1987). Nor are they the mechanism described by Ansoff and
McDonnell (1990) for monitoring and controlling the planing process to ensure the
program modules have reached acceptance prior to their implementation.
In each case, the adhoc programs described by the interviewees lack the formal
structure of a feedback system designed to promote thorough two-way communication in
an organization the size and complexity of the U.S. Navy. As with the stakeholder
analysis and resistance diagnosis, these efforts aimed at providing information to the Fleet
and feedback to the DD-21 program appear to be based on intuition rather that a
systematic process. Such a process should, according to Ansoff and McDonnell (1990),
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determine what information is relevant to the success of DD-2 1 , where that information
can be found and where it will be needed.
9. Summary
The data set contains a variety of potential elements of a resistance management
program. There are statements made by Navy leaders that acknowledge the need for
change. There are lists of stakeholders in DD-21, and potential sources of resistance to
optimized manning. There are projects in place, or being planned that could form the
basic parts of a commitment plan and feedback system. However, none of these elements
appear to have the analytical foundation recommended by the change management theory
described in Chapter HI. They instead, seem to be founded on the experience,
observations and knowledge of the planners ofDD-21 and optimized manning.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DD-21
This analysis of the DD-21 implementation plan is grounded on recognition that the
effort to manage resistance to optimized manning is in the planning and early transition
phases. It would be improper to assume that a critique of any resistance management plan
developed at this stage of the overall change process, was a good predictor of what that
same critique would yield after a formal plan was developed and put into action.
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the early plans and
intentions of the DD-21 program officers who will most likely be responsible for the
implementation of optimized manning, and to recommend improvements in view of change
management theory.
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1. Create an Analytical Foundation
The change management plans described by Beckhard and Harris (1987) and Ansoff
and McDonnell (1990) are based on systematic methods for identifying stakeholders, the
critical mass, sources of resistance and appropriate intervention strategies. A
recommendation from this study is to build acceptance and commitment for optimized
manning based on these formal analytical models. The strength of this approach is in
documenting influential stakeholder interests and managing and collaborating with
stakeholders to attain desired changes. In sum, strategy is aligned with systematic
stakeholder management. A weakness of this approach is stakeholder's needs often
evolve over time, and maintaining a formal systematic approach is itself difficult to
maintain.
The models of Beckhard and Harris (1987) described in Chapter HI do not require
analysis that provides a single "correct" number to every question. In fact, they state that
in the case of the critical mass, such an analysis may not be possible. A stakeholder
analysis may begin with a study of acquisition organization charts to determine which
organizations are tied to the development of DD-21 manpower requirements. Those
stakeholders could be augmented with addition of other relevant stakeholders from the
navy's manpower organization chart, and so on. The point is to systematically identify,
validate, analyze, and act-on evolving stakeholder concerns and issues related to optimized
manning. Extensive number generation and strict statistical analysis are not required.
What is required is an understanding of all the dynamics of implementing this type of an
approach to building acceptance of change.
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2. Select a Change Leader
Beckhard and Harris (1987) state that the best choice for a change leader and change
management system is one that creates the least tension with the current organizational
structure while at the same time creating a favorable environment to develop and
implement the new structure. Rogers (1995) describes a list of six characteristics of a
successful change agent. This individual must: (1) actively engage and involve critical
stakeholders, (2) be aligned with change implementers rather than change planners, (3)
diagnose the needs of the stakeholders relative to the change and ensure they are
addressed, (4) be able to empathize with the target stakeholders' concerns and
uncertainties, (5) be in contact with the lowest-echelon stakeholders, and (6) be
trustworthy and credible in the eyes of the stakeholders.
The implementation plan for DD-21 and optimized manning should have a person or
persons filling the roles of change leader and change manager, ideally with the
characteristics previously mentioned. It is not the purpose of this study to designate the
change leader for optimized manning. However, Beckhard and Harris (1987) state that an
innovation that differs greatly from the current state, requires leadership and management
structure that is separate from the current structure and uniquely tasked with the
implementation of the change. A close examination of the leadership requirements for
optimized manning implementation may determine that one person cannot fill the roles of
both change leader and manager. One individual may not be able to coordinate and
monitor the planning and implementation process and simultaneously marshal the support
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of optimized manning stakeholders. In such a case, the DD-21 hierarchy should consider
the appointment of a separate change leader and manager.
3. Create an Activity and Commitment Plan
According to cited change management literature, activity and commitment plans are
the working elements of a process for diagnosing resistance and building acceptance of
change. This study has examined a potentially relevant form of such a process, the
accordion method of managed resistance. That method depends on a series of
independent modules (action steps) that are related to a particular concern of a particular
stakeholder group. Each module utilizes independent planning, training and
implementation schedules that proceed along a timeline for the overall innovation process.
The advantage of such a system is its ability to adapt to changing time urgencies, and
the parallel nature of the modules. Each module is designed so that it can proceed
unhindered by the modules around it. Unlike a sequential planning and implementation
process, the delay of one program module will not halt the entire acceptance building
effort. The creation of separate program modules also turns the entire optimized manning
program into an incremental process.
Change management theory indicates that such a process will usually meet with less
resistance because the organization is presented with the innovation one small bit at a time
rather than all at once. Indeed, when one considers the entire set of changes underway in
the Surface Fleet, it can be argued that DD-21 is itself merely an incremental step in a
larger change process. In a broader sense, DD-21 might be presented as a logical step in a
long procession of changes that includes Smart Ship and leads ultimately to the end-state
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goal of an effective, efficient, streamlined military organization that maximizes the utility
of every available resource, including its officers and sailors.
4. Create a Feedback Mechanism
The success of the change leader and the innovation he or she promotes will depend
on the flow of timely and accurate information according to the systematic model. Details
of the DD-21 proposals must disseminate to Fleet operators, and in turn, their reactions
and recommendations must come back to the program planners. As a consequence of a
properly designed communications link, the designers of optimized manning may discover
any number of innovative ideas outside their immediate staff, and Fleet operators will
know their concerns are being addressed.
The final element of the commitment plan described by Beckhard and Harris (1987) is
the creation of a monitoring system, designed to assess the progress of the commitment
building effort. The monitoring system requires timely information from critical
stakeholders who are actively participating in the implementation plan. The purpose of
such a monitoring effort is to enable the change manager to effectively direct resources to
those stakeholders who have not yet accepted and committed to the success of the
innovation. Similarly, feedback allows change leaders to adjust strategies accordingly.
In the data, a DD-21 program officer claims to have extensive ties to many of the
manpower initiatives underway in the Navy. Those ties can form the basis for a feedback
network linking the stakeholders of optimized manning with the program office at
NAVSEA. However, such a system would require well defined reporting methods that
would enable the change leader to continually evaluate stakeholders, monitor progress,
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and make adjustments necessary in a shared power environment. In sum, feedback is
integral to determining the effectiveness of the process for building acceptance. The Navy
does not lack for a thorough communications system. Command relationships are also
well defined. Together, these existing systems can serve as the foundation of a very rich
medium for the type of communication called-for by the change management literature,
however, incentives are needed to encourage objective feedback throughout the military
hierarchy without regard to rank or position.
C. FINAL SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
Optimized manning is clearly a radical departure from the traditional manning and
operating philosophy of the Surface Navy. Change management theory says that
organizations that are instituting large-scale changes to their operating philosophy, culture,
power structures or pay and reward systems can expect to encounter resistance to that
change from many quarters (Ansoff & McDonnell, 1990). The changes contained in the
optimized manning proposals for DD-21 promise to touch nearly every aspect of the
Surface Warfare Community, and there is evidence that the Fleet operating core is
reacting to those proposals with skepticism and concern.
This thesis has examined the plans of the DD-21 program officers for the management
of resistance and building acceptance among the stakeholders in this change effort. A
varied data set has been evaluated against theoretical models for managing change. The
results of that analysis indicate the developers of optimized manning have acknowledged
the likelihood of resistance, and believe that such reactions must be mitigated to
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successfully implement optimized manning. However, the plans for building acceptance
for optimized manning appear to be based largely on anecdotal and intuitive data. This
thesis recommends that systematic methods be used to identify and analyze stakeholders,
sources of resistance and develop a commitment plan. A change leader should be selected
to coordinate the development and implementation of optimized manning, and a robust
feedback network is needed to provide the change leader a mechanism to judge the
effectiveness of the effort to build acceptance and reduce skepticism and concern.
This thesis has touched on only one small aspect of organizational change management
as that topic applies to the DD-21 program. Opportunities for further research are
numerous and include the following:
1
.
How will the Navy deal with the simultaneous requirements of one
Fleet built around traditionally manned and operated ships and a second
Fleet built around DD-21?
2. Conduct a comparison between the DD-21 proposals, the manning
reduction experience of the Dutch Navy and the study of manning
reduction in the merchant marine conducted by Richard Walton (1987).
3. What are the costs / benefits of the various DD-21 manning structure
proposals such as crew rotation and the transfer of most maintenance
responsibilities ashore or to a private entity?
4. Evaluate the resistance management POAM referred to in this study
against change management theory.
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5. Develop and validate a list of stakeholders and/or sources of resistance
to optimized manning in support of the resistance management POAM
referred to in this study.
6. Examine the potential for change in the Surface Navy's structure from
a machine bureaucracy to a professional bureaucracy as it moves to
implement DD-2 1 and optimized manning.
89
90
APPENDIX A. DD-21 SURVEY
1. Have you read or heard of the proposals for DD-21 to reduce crew manning to approx. 95?
Yes
No




3. From the list below, select four task areas that you think will cause the most problems for the
successful implementation of the manning proposals for DD-2 1
:
Admin/Record Keeping
At Sea Watch Cond. I
At Sea Watch Cond. II
At Sea Watch Cond. HI










Sea & Anchor Detail
UNREP
Working Parties
4. Please add any comments you have and/or list additional areas of concern you believe have not been
adequately examined for the DD-2 1 manning program.
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APPENDIX C. BOST INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1
.
There are two overarching questions:
a. What are the major drivers or facilitators for successful implementation ofDD-21
reduced manning?
b. What are the major sources of expected resistance to successful implementation of
DD-2 1 reduced manning?
2. Who are the major stakeholders in DD-21 with respect to reduced manning?
3. What roles do you expect them to play in a successful implementation?
4. What specific plan has been developed to capitalize on them?
5. What is being done to deal with resistance to DD-21 proposals?
6. A consultant for optimized manning is developing a POAM for building
acceptance.
a. Who will be responsible for implementing that plan (not by name)?
b. What characteristics are you looking for in that position?
c. Where in the chain of authority will they fit?
d. How will that POAM be binding on the entire DD-21 program office?
7. How do you view the potential success or failure of the CNO's Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle (IDTC) initiatives, Smart Ship and DC-ARM relative to your
efforts to build acceptance ofDD-21 reduced manning?
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APPENDIX D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS
1
.
There are two over arching questions:
a. What are the major drivers or facilitators for successful implementation ofDD-
21 reduced manning?
b. What are the major sources of expected resistance to successful
implementation ofDD-21 reduced manning?
2. How will you assess resistance during DD-21 program planning and implementation?
3
.
Who are the stakeholders in reduced manning?
4. How will you validate that list?
5. What specific plans are being developed to capitalize on those stakeholder's
knowledge or expertise?
6. The DD-21 office is developing a POAM for building acceptance of optimized
manning.
e. Who will/should be responsible for implementing that plan?
f How is the POAM organized (independent projects or sequential process)?
g. What are the likely elements of the POAM (education and training projects,
technical demonstrations, etc)?
7. How do you view the potential success or failure of the CNO's Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle (IDTC) initiatives, Smart Ship and DC-ARM relative to your efforts to
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